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Article 7

The First Amendment and the

Protection of Unfair Speech
Barbara McDowell*
One is tempted to try to explain the Fairness Doctrine as the product
of a generation that had been duped by Orson Welles's War of the Worlds
broadcast into believing that Martians really had landed in New Jersey. A
populace so susceptible to the persuasive power of the electronic media
might have seemed particularly in need of protection from bias in the
presentation of controversial issues.
That era has long since passed. Americans who have grown up with
television and radio-the commercials for products that did not live up to
their hype; the quiz shows and news shows whose deceptions were later
revealed; the moralizing of televangelists who proved to have feet of
clay-are not about to accept their messages uncritically. A cynical 63
percent of viewers queried in a recent Times Mirror survey opined that
television news tends to favor one side over the other on political and
social issues.' Yet, they tune in anyway. They also tune in to Rush
Limbaugh and Jerry Brown, Mary Matalin and Jesse Jackson, Jerry Falwell
and Howard Stem, and a diverse array of other political and social
commentators in the electronic marketplace of ideas.
As Adrian Cronauer explains, whether or not television and radio
coverage of public issues is indeed as biased as those in the Times Mirror
survey seemed to believe, any such bias is of no proper concern to the
government. It is contrary to fundamental First Amendment principles for
federal officials to sit as arbiters of "fairness" of news and public-affairs
programs, especially when those very officials also have the power to grant
or deny the licenses that are essential to broadcasters' livelihoods.'
* B.A. George Washington University, 1974; J.D. Yale University, 1985; Partner,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. The Author is a former law clerk to Justice Byron White.
1. Christopher Stem, Viewers Trust TV News, Support Censorship, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 32, 32. Americans nonetheless professed more trust for television
news than for newspapers, church, or the nation's leader. Id.
2. That fairness cannot be constitutionally enforced by the government does not, of
course, mean that fairness cannot and should not be aspired to by broadcasters themselves.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

To be sure, the Supreme Court held a quarter-century ago in Red Lion
BroadcastingCo. v. FCC that the Fairness Doctrine was constitutional.' At
the same time, however, the Court noted that its conclusion could be
reconsidered in the future should experience indicate that the Fairness
Doctrine had the "net effect of reducing rather than enhancing" the
discussion of controversial public issues.4 Red Lion has since been
undermined by an explosion of media outlets, as Mr. Cronauer notes and
as the Court itself has seemed to acknowledge.' Moreover, even were these
technological developments less dramatic, Red Lion still could not be easily
reconciled with the Court's more recent First Amendment jurisprudence.
Since Red Lion, the Court increasingly has recognized that "broadcasters are entitled under the First Amendment to exercise 'the widest
journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties]."' 6 It has thus
cautioned against "enlargement of Government control over the content of
broadcast discussion of public issues."7 For example, in CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, the Court rejected the suggestion that
broadcasters be required to accept all paid political advertisements,
explaining that such a requirement would unduly intrude on broadcasters'
editorial discretion.8 Further, in FCC v. League of Women Voters, the
Court struck down a prohibition on editorializing by public broadcasters
who receive federal funds.9
The Court emphasized in these cases that, although the broadcast
medium may be subject to greater regulation than are other media, any such
regulation can be sustained only under a rigorous standard: the regulation
must be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest"

The codes of ethics applicable to broadcast journalists have long provided that news
material should be presented in a manner that is "balanced, accurate and fair." CODE OF
BROADCAST NEws ETHICS OF THE RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION; see
also SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS CODE OF ETHICS. It is to be hoped that the

electronic marketplace of the future will continue to contain stations practicing responsible
journalism that present multiple sides of the issues, as well as the stations envisioned by Mr.
Cronauer that will cater to the partisan views of each political, ethnic, or economic faction
with sufficient market power.
3. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
4. Id. at 393.
5. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.1l (1984).
6. Id. at 378 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973))).
7. Id. at 379-80 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 126
(1973)).
8. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. at 123-25.
9. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364.
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that outweighs any countervailing infringement on broadcasters' First
Amendment rights. °
It is difficult to see how the Fairness Doctrine could be sustained
today under such a standard. That the government had no legitimate, let
alone "substantial," interest in regulating the press for "fairness" seems
clear under the Court's post-Red Lion decisions in Miami HeraldPublishand Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
ing Co. v. Tornillo"
2
Commission.'
The Tornillo case presented a First Amendment challenge to a state
"right-of-reply" statute. The statute required a newspaper that had attacked
a political candidate's "personal character" or "official record" to, at the
candidate's request, "immediately publish free of cost any reply he may
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type" as
the attack.'" The statute thus operated as a sort of Fairness Doctrine
applicable to newspaper coverage of political candidates. A unanimous
Court struck down the statute on First Amendment grounds, declaring that
the government cannot compel the press "to publish that which "'reason"
tells them should not be published.""' 4 The Court offered two reasons for
its decision.
First, the Court explained that a governmentally mandated right-ofreply, rather than increasing the diversity of voices in the media, "inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.""... As the
Court noted, whenever a newspaper published news 6r commentary that
was critical of a political candidate, and thus could give rise to a right-ofreply under the statute, the newspaper would risk incurring such penalties
as the costs of editing and printing the candidate's reply and the lost space
that could otherwise be devoted to material of its own choosing. 6 In view
of these potential penalties, "editors might well conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy," with the result that "political and electoral
coverage would be blunted or reduced."' 7
Second, the Court explained that "the treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute[s] the exercise of
editorial control and judgment," a process that the government must leave

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 380.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 104.38 (1973)).
Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945)).
Id. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

exclusively to the press itself 8 "It has yet to be demonstrated how
government regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press .... .""
The Court accepted that its decision in Tornillo could produce a press
that was less fair, less accurate, and less balanced. "A responsible press is
an undoubtedly desirable goal," said the Court, "but press responsibility is
not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be
legislated."2 Curiously, while Tornillo was decided just five years after
Red Lion, neither the majority opinion nor the two concurrences even cited
Red Lion, much less tried to distinguish it.
A decade later in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a sort of Fairness Doctrine applicable to the space inside
a private utility company's billing envelopes. Pacific Gas & Electric had for
many years inserted its own newsletter into the monthly billing envelopes
sent to its customers. 2 The state Public Utilities Commission then directed
Pacific Gas & Electric to include in its billing envelopes four times a year
the newsletter of a consumer organization with which the utility disagreed.
The Court struck down the requirement on First Amendment grounds,
with both the plurality and the concurring justices invoking Tornillo.
Writing for the four-justice plurality, Justice Powell explained that such
"[c]ompelled access" to a communications medium impermissibly
"penalizes the expression of particular points of view and forces speakers
to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set."22 Justice
Powell observed that Pacific Gas & Electric might be deterred by the
Commission's order from speaking out on controversial issues, "because
access is awarded only to those who disagree with [its] views and who are
hostile to [its] interests."23 In addition, he noted that Pacific Gas &
Electric would be required "to associate with speech with which [it] may
disagree," and thus might have to engage in additional speech of its own
in order to distance itself from the consumer organization's message. 24
The plurality attempted to distinguish Red Lion in a footnote on the
ground that Pacific Gas & Electric's "billing envelopes do not... present
the same constraints that justify the result" in that case.2 1 "No person can

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 9 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
Id.at 14.
Id.at 15-16.
Id.at 10 n.6.
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broadcast without a license, whereas all persons are free to send correspondence to private homes through the mails. 26 The Court did not explain
how, as a practical matter, a citizen would encounter any less onerous
"constraints" in mailing a newsletter to all Pacific Gas & Electric customers
than in obtaining television or radio time. In any event, as Mr. Cronauer
contends and as the Court has implied, the issue is not whether any
particular individual's voice is heard, but whether a diversity of viewpoints
is presented on a given issue."
What the Supreme Court said in Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric
about the evils of compelled access is, in fact, equally applicable to
broadcasters. The Court has never said otherwise. Indeed, the potential to
interfere with editorial judgment and to stifle public debate may be even
greater with respect to radio and television, both because of the inherent
nature of the broadcast medium and because of the government's licensing
authority over broadcasters.
The broadcaster's most essential resource-airtime-is even more
limited than the publisher's newsprint and ink. The Court recognized as
much when striking down the newspaper right-of-reply statute in Tornillo,
noting that "a newspaper is not subject to the finite technological
limitations of time that confront a broadcaster." 28 The risk of taking on a
controversial subject is thus all the greater for broadcasters because they
may be required to expend precious air time on that which "'reason' tells
'
them should not be [aired]." 29
Even more significant, however, is the impact of government
licensing. The ultimate sanction for Fairness Doctrine violations was, of
course, the FCC's refusal to renew the broadcaster's license. In view of the
"tremendous potency" of this sanction, 30 regardless of the frequency with
which it was actually imposed, a broadcaster "might well conclude that the
safe course is to avoid controversy."'" An additional incentive to timidity
was the costs, such as employee time and legal fees, that broadcasters

26. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 543
(1980)).
27. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 113 (1973) ("[T]he
Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right
to command the use of broadcast facilities.").
28. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).
29. Id. at 256.
30. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (McGowan, J.,dissenting), rev'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
31. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
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incurred in dealing with even those fairness complaints that were eventually
deemed meritless.
As Chief Judge Bazelon wrote in this Journal fifteen years ago,
"[w]hen the right to continue to operate a lucrative broadcast facility turns
on periodic government approval, even a governmental 'raised eyebrow'
can send otherwise intrepid entrepreneurs running for the cover of
conformity."32 A similar response may be seen in broadcasters' susceptibility to informal pressure from Congress and the FCC on television
violence, despite the serious constitutional issues that would be presented
by any formal government effort to restrict such material.33
In addition to its potential for causing broadcasters to engage in
self-censorship, the Fairness Doctrine also provided government officials
with a means of censoring critical opinions or disfavored broadcasters. As
Mr. Cronauer notes, at least two presidential administrations attempted to
use the Fairness Doctrine to suppress views that they opposed.34 Officials
of less exalted rank also invoked the Fairness Doctrine to serve their
political agendas.35 The opportunities for abuse by government officials
were enhanced in the final years of the Fairness Doctrine with the FCC's
decision that government agencies, and in particular the Central Intelligence
Agency, had standing to prosecute fairness complaints to force greater
coverage of the government's side of an issue.36
In sum, the Fairness Doctrine, like those other means of "[c]ompelled
access" to a speaker's facilities that the Supreme Court had condemned,
cannot be reconciled with our traditional understanding of the First
Amendment. The constitutional protections of free speech and a free press
were designed, after all, to prevent government censorship of speech that
was partisan, intemperate, and unfair. As Justice Stewart explained: "Those
32. David Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"--New Directions in
Regulating Telecommunications 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 206 (1979) (cited in In re Inquiry
into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Concerning the Gen. Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Brdcst. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, para. 31 (1985)
(proceeding terminated) [hereinafter FairnessReport], petitionfor review sub. nom. RadioTelevision News Directors Assoc. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 831 F.2d 1148
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
33. See Writers Guild of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979); Timothy B. Dyk & Ralph E.
Goldberg, The First Amendment and CongressionalInvestigationsof Broadcast Programming, 3 J.L. & POL. 625, 636 (1987).
34. See FRED FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GuYs AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 32-42 (1976); see also FairnessReport, supra note 32, para. 75.

35. See, e.g., Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Complaint of Rep.
Patsy Mink, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, paras. 1-6 (1976).
36. In re Central Intelligence Agency v. American Brdest. Cos., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1544, 1548-49 (1985).
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who wrote our First Amendment ... believed that 'fairness' was far too
fragile to be left for a Government bureaucracy to accomplish. History has
'
many times confirmed the wisdom of their choice."37
But perhaps it was Justice White, the author of Red Lion, who put it
most eloquently in his later concurrence in Tornillo:
Of course, the press is not always accurate, or even responsible, and
may not present full and fair debate on important public issues. But the

balance struck by the First Amendment with respect to the press is that
society must take the risk that occasionally debate on vital matters will
not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not be expressed
Any other accommodation-any other system that would supplant
private control of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion-would make the government the censor of what the people may
read and know."
Just as the government cannot, under the First Amendment, be the censor
of what the press may publish and the people may read in the print media,
so too the government cannot be the censor of what broadcasters may air
and the people may see and hear on television and radio.

37. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 145-46 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
38. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring).

